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Through its Basel III reform package, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is seeking to 
improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, thereby 
reducing the possibility of spill-over from the financial sector to the real economy.  
The outcome of the reforms is dependent on the timeliness and reliability of the banks’ provisioning 
practices for loan losses. This is because provisions are deducted directly from equity capital. 
Consequently, to the extent that a bank’s provisioning levels are inadequate to absorb expected credit 
losses in its business, the bank’s capital adequacy will be overstated.  
In contrast to previous studies that focus on bank provisioning practices under accounting standards for 
reporting to the market, this study focuses on practices under prudential standards for reporting to the 
banking regulator. The change in focus is important in terms of examining the role of provisioning in 
supporting the Basel capital requirements, because the study covers a period when accounting standards in 
Australia and internationally moved to an incurred-loss model of provisioning.  
The incurred-loss model is problematic for supervisory review and the market-enforced discipline of banks’ 
capital adequacy because it delays the recognition of losses until financial assets are close to default.  
To address this shortcoming, the Australian banking regulator has maintained a forward-looking 
provisioning model to capture expected future credit losses in a bank’s business by decoupling its 
provisioning requirements from Australian accounting standards. The forward-looking model is consistent 
with the expected loss approach to provisioning advocated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) under Basel III.  
This study provides a practical test of the forward-looking provisioning model, by examining the 
responsiveness of these types of provisions to bank-specific measures of credit risk. Such a test is not 
available in many countries, including the US, which continue to rely on accounting standards for both 
financial reporting and prudential review.  
The study investigates the role of the regulatory provisioning model in supporting the risk-based capital 
requirements for Australian banks. Previous studies find evidence that bank managers take account of 
regulatory and market expectations concerning their capital adequacy and earnings when setting 
accounting provisions. However, as the regulatory provisions examined in this study are not disclosed to 
the market as part of a bank’s half- or full-year financial results, the bank may have less incentive to smooth 
reported earnings or to manage earnings expectations using these provisions. However, the greater 
discretion afforded to banks when setting regulatory provisions warrants a closer examination of their 
quality and their relationship with regulatory capital under the Basel rules.  
 
 
 
 
Although regulatory provisions have a directly negative impact on a bank’s regulatory capital in the current 
period, by providing a loss-absorbing buffer, the provisions may reduce the extent to which capital is 
depleted in the event of a future economic downturn. Consequently, a sufficient provisioning buffer may 
help alleviate the extent to which capital requirements act to restrict lending activities as a result of credit 
losses realised in future periods. It is argued that this form of risk management is more likely to be effective 
if the provisions are drawn from surplus regulatory capital, because in this case the bank avoids being 
subject to greater regulatory and market scrutiny in the short term. Accordingly, this study tests whether 
the strength of a bank’s capital base in excess of Basel minimum requirements is a relevant factor when the 
bank raises provisions against credit exposures.  
Based on quarterly data for 22 banks operating in Australia from March 2004 to December 2012, the study 
examines the responsiveness of the regulatory provisions to bank-specific measures of credit risk and their 
relationship with regulatory capital under the Basel rules. 
The key findings of the research are that: 
 Regulatory provisions reflect meaningful information about the default risk associated with banks’ 
loan portfolios. 
 Banks allocate part of their surplus capital in excess of Basel minimum requirements to pre-fund 
future credit losses through provisions (which holds for banks using either external or internal 
ratings-based approaches to credit risk). 
 Banks accumulate additional provisions when their earnings are higher. 
These findings suggest that bank provisioning behaviour has both pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical 
characteristics: provisions are sensitive to cyclical fluctuations in default risk. However, banks adjust 
provisions to cushion the impact of cyclical fluctuations in capital adequacy and earnings. 
The study provides evidence that banks use the regulatory provisioning model for risk management by 
building a buffer that supports the stability of the bank capital base against future credit losses. By 
providing a loss-absorbing buffer, the provisions will reduce the extent to which capital is depleted during a 
subsequent economic downturn. Consequently, a sufficient provisioning buffer is likely to help alleviate the 
extent to which capital requirements act to restrict lending activities as a result of credit losses realised in 
the future. 
 
 
